We evaluate the effect of relaxing fiscal rules on budget outcomes in a quasi-experimental setup. In 1999, the Italian central government introduced fiscal rules-known as the Domestic Stability Pact-aimed at disciplining the budget management of municipal governments, and in 2001 decided to relax the Pact for municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. The latter institutional change allows us to implement a difference-indiscontinuities design, which combines before/after and discontinuous policy variation. Our estimates show that the relaxation of fiscal rules translates into a larger deficit and lower local taxes, while municipal expenditure remains almost unchanged. The impact is higher when budget rigidity is high (that is, when personnel expenditure and debt services are a large share of current expenditure) and when mayors can run for reelection. A pre-2001 falsification test shows that our findings are not driven by the fact that municipalities below and above 5,000 are differentially affected by fiscal rules.
